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FOREWORD
At this writing, the strategic balance may have shifted in
the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, and the region could be
on the verge of a settlement. But, the "window of opportunity"
may be fleeting, and the failures and frustrations of the past
four years temper any optimism that conflict in the former
Yugoslavia will end quickly or completely. If this opening passes
without an end to the fighting, the United States may have to
reassess its fundamental policy objectives–and the ways and means
to achieve them–if peace is to be effected in the Balkans.
The intent of this report, therefore, is to analyze and
assess existing policies, to identify any conflicts or
contradictions that may stymie U.S. efforts to bring about a
peaceful resolution of the crisis, and to offer potential
solutions. The report does not offer an ambitious criticism of
policy or an "expert's" solution to an intractable problem. Its
more modest goal is to examine current policy within a context
that fits Bosnia into the larger pattern of U.S. interests and
policy. In this manner, the report offers a broader framework for
the strategic decisions that may face the United States in the
not so distant future.
The Strategic Studies Institute offers this contribution to
assist those engaged in the national dialog over U.S. policy in
the Balkans.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies
Institute
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KEY JUDGMENTS
• While the war in Bosnia is complex and confusing, these
circumstances should not deter the United States from seeking
potential solutions to this conflict. The severity of potential
European and global consequences should drive U.S. policymakers
to take an even more proactive role in efforts to resolve the
conflict.
• Stated and de facto U.S. policy objectives are not
mutually reinforcing. Indeed, the goal of restoring the
territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina conflicts with other
objectives: preventing the spread of fighting; stemming the flow
of refugees; halting the slaughter of innocents; and helping
support NATO's central role, while maintaining the U.S. role in
shaping Europe's security architecture. The United States must
seriously reconsider whether it should retain or revise this
goal.
• The stability and security of the entire Balkan peninsula
may be at risk. Prolonged disequilibrium could set back the
development of newly emerging democracies in the region. An
expanded conflict would likely bring Greece and Turkey–key NATO
allies–into the conflict, probably on opposite sides.
• Protracted conflict in the Balkans could strain relations
between Europe and Russia, as well as between the United States
and Russia. This could lead to renationalization of security
agendas in Central and Eastern Europe that could forestall the
extension of market democracies in those critical regions. The
consequences for Western European security policies are obvious.
• Increased strains within NATO could reduce the U.S.
ability to influence events in Europe; an outcome certainly not
in long-term U.S. interests.
• Continued conflict in the former Yugoslavia is likely to
diminish U.S. public support for substantial U.S. engagement in
international affairs. The perceived ineptitude of the United
Nations and intramural squabbling within NATO could undermine
U.S. public support for both of those key security organizations.
• The inability of the United States to shape a resolution
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of the war in the former Yugoslavia could undermine U.S.
influence in key areas of the world. Concomitantly, potential
opponents might perceive that they could challenge U.S. interests
at low levels without fear of penalty. These phenomena could
contribute to a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad that
might erode the U.S. deterrent capability to the point where an
adversary might directly confront U.S. interests.
• The long-term European and global consequences for the
United States from short-term decisions on Bosnia could be
substantial. Thus, while it may be simplistic to say it, any
decisions concerning further U.S. involvement in the Bosnian war
must be framed in light of these consequences, and not simply in
accordance with the day-to-day exigencies of the Balkan crisis.
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U.S. POLICY IN THE BALKANS:
A HOBSON'S CHOICE
INTRODUCTION
The United States is already engaged militarily in the
ongoing crisis in the Balkans. Since November 1992, U.S. naval
vessels have taken part in the maritime enforcement of the U.N.
embargo of the belligerents. U.S. Air Force transport aircraft
have dropped tons of humanitarian aid to besieged enclaves. U.S.
Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft participate daily in the
enforcement of the U.N. "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Hercegovina,
have shot down Bosnian Serb aircraft, and have been the principal
participants in NATO bombing missions supporting the U. N.
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia- Hercegovina. American
planes have been fired on by Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft batteries
and surface-to-air missiles and one USAF F-16 has been shot down.
U.S. Marines have already undertaken military action on the
ground in Bosnia to rescue downed Air Force pilot Captain Scott
O'Grady. To the south, over 500 U.S. soldiers are in Macedonia to
1
deter expansion of the conflict.
Given the escalating nature of the conflict (e.g., Bosnian
Serb seizure of "safe havens" and Croatian offensives in the
Krajina region), U.S. engagement may deepen suddenly, requiring
quick decisions concerning increased U.S. military involvement in
the crisis. Indeed, nearly every potential turn of events could
lead to an increased commitment of U.S. military force to the
region. Potential ethnic Bosnian Serb attacks against the
remaining "safe havens" have brought NATO threats of "firm and
rapid response of NATO's air power" that would undoubtedly
2
involve large numbers of U.S. aircraft.
The United States also has pledged to assist the withdrawal
of UNPROFOR in Bosnia should that become necessary. Increased
fighting, failure to achieve a negotiated settlement, or the
unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo could trigger such an
3
operation, involving up to 25,000 U.S. ground troops.
A rise in the already high levels of violence against
civilians could lead public opinion to demand increased U.S.
4
military involvement.
The current U.S. peace plan being
explained to allies, partners, and belligerents contains numerous



military "sticks" that might be employed if "carrots" fail to
bring about an end to the fighting. These "sticks" include
replacing UNPROFOR peacekeepers with NATO forces, undoubtedly
5
including U.S. forces.
Should a peace settlement be brokered,
the United States has committed to providing upwards of 25,000
6
personnel to participate in peacekeeping operations.
In short,
the United States may be inexorably drawn into increased military
engagement in the Balkans.
Before U.S. political leaders make their decisions on
whether (or more likely, when and how) to increase U.S. military
involvement, they must factor a number of complicating
7
considerations into their deliberations.
First, Bosnian Serbs
and Serbia are likely to see any increased NATO or U.S. military
commitment as directed against them. Second, the government of
Bosnia-Hercegovina is likely to view increased U.S. engagement as
a guarantee of Bosnia's existence and sovereignty, thereby
bolstering the will to resist. Third, Serbia will undoubtedly
perceive increased U.S. engagement as a threat to Serbian
interests, precipitating a Serbian reaction that could lead to
intervention by the Yugoslav Army and a widening of the war.
Fourth, other states in the region and Russia may view increased
U.S. or NATO military activities as a commitment to a Balkan-wide
security system.
Decisionmakers also must look beyond the current crisis and
fit Bosnia into the larger pattern of U.S. interests and policy.
For example, increased U.S. involvement in the crisis could add
to existing tensions within NATO, strain U.S. bilateral relations
with key allies or new partners in Central and Eastern Europe, or
generate substantial repercussions for U.S.- Russian relations.
Intra-European relations could also be strained. Understanding
the potential consequences of their actions offers policymakers
an opportunity to identify new or clarify existing U.S. policy
options for Bosnia-Hercegovina. To that end, this report will
explicate the wider issues involved in the current and potential
U.S. engagement in the Balkan crisis to establish a broader
framework for the strategic decisions facing the United States.
To provide this context, the report addresses four major
questions overarching the ongoing crisis in the Balkans:
• What are the key principles that the United States wishes
to uphold?



• What are U.S. objectives concerning the conflict, and are
they mutually reinforcing or in conflict?
• Under what conditions should the United States apply
military force to achieve those objectives?
• What are the potential consequences inherent in the use of
military power?
KEY PRINCIPLES OF U.S. POLICY
At the most basic level, several key principles guide the
formulation of U.S. foreign policy and are germane to the Balkan
crisis. First is the fundamental belief that "America's core
value [is] freedom, embodied in democratic governance and market
8
economics . . . ."
Also at stake is the U.S. tradition of
9
Finally,
supporting human dignity and respect for human rights.
the current administration has articulated a global policy of
engagement, the very viability of which is affected by events in
the former Yugoslavia. In succinct form, our leaders hold that
"Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the
community of market democracies while deterring and containing a
10
range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests."
Specific U.S. interests in Europe also shape U.S. policy for
the Balkans. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement stipulates three major U.S. national interests in
Europe: a stable and secure Europe achieved through military
strength and cooperation; U.S. access to open and vibrant
European market economies; and support for the growth of
democracy and individual freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe,
11
especially Russia.
The key issue becomes how to secure these
interests, given the current conditions in the Balkans.

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
also establishes broad guidelines for effecting these principles.
12
First, the United States will exercise global leadership.
But,
realizing the limits of American resources and capabilities, the
United States will exercise selective engagement, ". . . focusing
on the challenges that are most relevant to our interests and
13
focusing our resources where we can make the most difference."
Selective engagement, constrained resources, and the belief that



many challenges demand multinational solutions lead the United
States to participate in multilateral efforts. The conviction
that U.S. participation in a wide range of collective
decisionmaking benefits the United States reinforces this
14
conclusion.
That having been said, the National Security
Strategy holds that where necessary, or where national interests
15
dictate, the United States will act alone.
Finally, U.S. ". . .
global interests and historical ideals impel us to oppose those
who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful
16
neighbors."
U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR THE CONFLICT
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Turning from general principles and interests to concrete
realities, the National Security Strategy lays out five specific
U.S. policy goals in the former Yugoslavia:
• A political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the
country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for
all its peoples;
• Preventing the spread of fighting into a broader Balkan
war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new
democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe;
• Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the
conflict;
• Halting the slaughter of innocents; and
• Helping to support NATO's central role in post-Cold War
Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security
17
architecture.
Not contained within the National Security Strategy, but
extremely important for the formulation and execution of U.S.
policy in the Balkans is the aversion to deploying ground forces
to the region except under certain, very circumscribed
18
conditions. Indeed, avoiding ground commitments, especially
combat troops, has been a de facto goal in its own right.
These national goals, then, should shape the policy options
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in the region. A first step in developing those options is
subjecting the national goals to a rigorous analysis to identify
internal contradictions or potentially conflicting objectives.
Unfortunately, the complexity of forces in the region present
such contradictions in abundance and sorting through them sheds
light on the significant challenges for those individuals charged
with crafting policies to achieve U.S. goals in the Balkans.
The Conundrum of Preserving Bosnian Territorial Integrity.
The goal of preserving the territorial integrity of BosniaHercegovina, for example, is highly problematic. Economic and
diplomatic efforts, to date, have not proved successful, and are
unlikely to be so in the future. Ethnic polarization of the
country has deepened sharply during more than three years of
fighting and ethnic cleansing. Therefore, if the U.S. goal of
preserving Bosnia's territorial integrity is to be more than a
diplomatic holding pattern, military action, to include the
deployment of ground forces, may be required. But avoiding the
deployment of ground troops remains a key–and conflicting–goal.
Unless the Bosnian government's military capacity vis-a-vis its
opponents improves markedly, or unless the United States can
prevail upon allies or partners to undertake the responsibility
for restoring the status quo ante bellum of 1991, the goal of
maintaining Bosnia's territorial integrity will likely not be
realized. To date, no other country has indicated the willingness
20
to undertake such action.
Thus, so long as the United States retains the policy goal
of maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina,
it runs the risk of engaging ground forces in the conflict.
Policymakers must recognize this policy azimuth or redefine their
goal. If the United States is unwilling to revise its objectives
concerning Bosnia's territorial integrity, then it may be better
for the United States to introduce ground forces before a crisis
emerges that makes an eventual intervention more costly in terms
of resources and lives. Here, however, lies another
contradiction. Neither our NATO allies, nor Russia, nor the
American public support direct military action to force a
settlement. Only if the war provokes a crisis of greater
proportions than has already occurred is that reluctance to
engage on the ground likely to change.



Even if military action was a realistic consideration, would
the United States and its allies be willing to exert the level of
military force that would be necessary to defeat the ethnic
Bosnian Serb forces, and, perhaps the Yugoslav Army? Are U.S. and
European publics willing to underwrite the levels of forces and
resources that might be required? Are they willing to sustain the
casualties that might result? For how long? Current indications
offer little evidence of the level of governmental or public
21
commitment that would likely be required.
The remaining alternative would be to provide the Bosnians
with the means for effective resistance. This option implies
lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. But, to date, the United
States has been unable to build the consensus necessary to effect
such action internationally. Moreover, unilateral U.S. lifting of
the embargo is highly problematic, as Britain and France have
22
indicated that such a move would prompt an UNPROFOR withdrawal.
This, in turn, would require U.S. ground troops to assist in the
withdrawal–an outcome that the United States seeks to avoid.
Lifting the arms embargo to "level the playing field," and
to allow the Bosnian government to defend the territory it
currently holds does not secure its authority over all of Bosnia.
That goal, despite the boost to it by Croatia's recent success in
the Krajina region, seems well out of reach of the Bosnian
government. Only substantial military aid, and time to receive,
distribute, and train on it, could produce such an outcome.
Whether the aid or the time would be available without largescale U.S. intervention is not known. But, even were such an
outcome to occur (i.e., military defeat of the Bosnian Serbs)
without deeper U.S. involvement, the United States and its allies
and partners would face the prospect of tens of thousands more
Serb refugees–which contradicts the objective of stemming the
destabilizing flow of refugees.
Even absent a flood of refugees, lifting the arms embargo
against Bosnia raises additional questions. First, how much aid
should be allowed to flow to the Bosnian government? This is not
a calculation that can be made with a high degree of certainty.
Too little aid simply prolongs the war by raising Bosnian
expectations, but not necessarily providing adequate capabilities
to prevail. Too much assistance could lead to an overwhelming
defeat of Bosnian Serb forces that might cause Bosnian government



forces to overreach, precipitating intervention by the Yugoslav
Army on behalf of their ethnic brethren. Finally, there is the
larger issue of whether the Yugoslav Army would permit a Bosnian
Serb defeat under any condition.
Underwriting the territorial integrity of Bosnia also
implies that the United States is unwilling to see the Bosnian
government irrevocably be defeated. To prevent such an outcome
may require direct U.S. military engagement. Air power, alone, is
not likely to provide a sufficient shield, and ground troops may
be required to preclude defeat. But, again, this option conflicts
with the existing U.S. policy of not employing U.S. ground
forces. Absent U.S. or European intervention, the only possible
way to prevent a Bosnian defeat might require introducing forces
from outside the region–such as the new U.S. initiative that
supposedly calls for the introduction of forces from the Muslim
23
world, which would be highly inflammatory.
Should the parties involved agree that less than full
territorial integrity of Bosnia might be an "acceptable" goal,
who would determine and then enforce what constituted an
appropriate settlement? Certainly, the goals of the Bosnian
government are likely to exceed those of outside parties involved
in the conflict. Given recent Croatian and Bosnian successes on
the battlefield, it is highly unlikely that Bosnian expectations
for greater territory will diminish. Even should the Bosnian
government initially settle for less than the full restoration of
its borders, how long might that settlement last before
revanchist and irredentist forces began to emerge? While the
answers to such questions are not known for certain, the
probability for a return to conflict is high.
Nor would a territorial settlement envisaged under the
existing Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the
United States) plan (51 percent of the territory for the BosnianCroatian federation and 49 percent for ethnic Serbs) or the
similar U.S. plan currently circulating in Europe meet the
requirement to ". . . provide a viable future for all its
24
peoples." Policymakers must recall that one of the primary
causes of this conflict is that not one ethnic group is willing
to remain under the political control of another ethnic group.
Thus, absent a massive exchange of populations after the
conclusion of hostilities–in other words, legally sanctioned
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ethnic cleansing–the seeds of future conflict will be sown.
Granted, this may be the best settlement possible at the moment,
but policymakers should be under no illusions that the
territorial divisions currently under consideration will result
in a long-term resolution of the underlying sources of the
conflict.
In a broader context, support for Bosnian territorial
integrity raises a larger issue. On the one hand, by restoring
the territorial integrity of Bosnia, the United States and its
partners would be endorsing the Bosnian desire to secede from the
Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, they would be denying
ethnic Serbs their right to exercise self-determination and to
secede from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Support for Bosnian selfdetermination also directly conflicts with the concept of
preserving the territorial integrity of existing nation-states
(i.e., the former Yugoslavia) which has been the fundamental
organizing principle of modern international politics since the
26
Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Finally, where does selfdetermination logically end? How does support for selfdetermination stack up against the chaotic prospect of dozens or
hundreds of ever dividing states in Europe and elsewhere?
Squaring these interlocking circles, specifically and generally,
will be profoundly difficult and will vex policymakers as they
craft policies for resolving the conflict in the Balkans.
Containing the Conflict.
To date, efforts to contain the conflict and prevent the
spread of fighting have been largely successful. How long that
success can be sustained in the face of increasing pressures from
belligerents for a military resolution of the crisis remains to
be seen. For instance, Croatian successes have resulted in
Serbian counter-deployments along their borders and rhetoric
27
that could lead to a resumption of the Serbo-Croatian war.
Croatian offensives north and east of Dubrovnik also could spark
a reaction from Serbia. Or, successful Croatian-Bosnian
offensives against Bosnian Serb areas (e.g., Banja Luka or the
Brcko corridor) could precipitate Serbian intervention. This
time, however, given the increased firepower and capabilities of
each side, the war could be substantially bloodier, with the
potential to spill over the borders of the former Yugoslavia.



Nor, given the recent successes against ethnic Serbs, is the
Bosnian government likely to agree to an early settlement. After
four years of failed negotiations and recent battlefield success,
it may have concluded that much more is to be gained through
continuing the war than by ending it. And, so long as the war
continues, the potential for the crisis to spin out of control
and escape its current bounds remains a clear possibility.
Refugees.
Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees has been
partially successful. Internally, the past flow of refugees
28
within the borders of the former Yugoslavia has been extensive.
The U.N. and other relief organizations have been able to cope,
more or less. While the levels of misery have been high, these
organizations have succeeded in keeping significant numbers of
people alive. This, in turn, has kept the overflow of refugees
into Europe, as a whole, at manageable levels.
A number of problems, however, may upset the delicate
balance within the former Yugoslavia that could have
destabilizing effects on the crisis. Within Bosnia and Croatia,
rising numbers of Bosnian refugees have already strained
29
relations within the Bosnian-Croat Federation. The "ethnic
cleansing" of Croats and Muslims in the Banja Luka region to make
way for ethnic Serbs displaced from the Krajina will undoubtedly
30
increase those frictions.
The large numbers of ethnic Serbs fleeing from the Krajina
to Serbia (estimates range from 150-200,000) also pose longer31
term problems. This influx of refugees, extremely bitter at
their perceived desertion by Serbia and, especially, Slobodan
Milosevic, could spark an internal crisis within Serbia. This
could lead Milosevic to harden his attitude toward a potential
peace settlement, or could precipitate the intervention of the
32
Yugoslav Army into the crisis in an effort to retain his power.
Any massive increases resulting from further large-scale
offensive operations or ethnic cleansing, moreover, run the risk
of overwhelming local, as well as U.N. capacities and will
greatly compound these problems.
Over the long term, the number of refugees in Serbia may
form an irredentist bloc within national politics that could



exert negative influences–from a U.S. perspective–for a
considerable time. Additionally, Serb plans to settle a
proportion of these refugees in the already tense Kosovo region
could spark a crisis that holds the significant potential to
33
trigger a general Balkan war.
Refugee flow outside the former Yugoslavia has remained
within manageable levels, and apparently has not overly strained
the capacity of European neighbors to absorb it. That said,
Germany, which has accommodated the largest percentage of
refugees, has called for European Union members to establish a
quota system to ensure a more equitable distribution of refugees
34
among member states. A large increase in the numbers of refugees
within Bosnia, or the former Yugoslavia, could nonetheless place
a strain on the European ability to respond. Certainly, a massive
refugee flow resulting from a wider Balkan war would place
significant strains that would have consequences for the emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that are contiguous to
the current conflict.
Halting the Slaughter of Innocents.
This goal has not been realized. While war in the former
Yugoslavia was not inevitable, the pent up emotions, strident
nationalism, inadequate political institutions, statal
disintegration, and economic dislocations that accompanied the
dissolution of the Yugoslav state made war–and its attendant
depredations on noncombatants–likely. However, individual
atrocities on a broad scale, and state-sponsored, or at least
condoned, "ethnic cleansing" have exponentially increased the
suffering. The fact that external actors (e.g., the U.N., the
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe [OSCE], the
European Union [EU], and the Contact Group) have been unable
either rapidly to agree on goals, or the ways and means to
achieve those goals, has contributed to the prolongation of the
fighting. That having been said, too little credit, especially in
the United States, has been given to U.N. efforts to attenuate
the violence and to provide humanitarian assistance.
Supporting NATO's Central Role in Post-Cold War Europe.
The NATO experience in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
has not "help[ed] to support NATO's central role in post-Cold War



Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security
architecture." Within the Contact Group, for example, Russo35
Franco-British and U.S.-German positions diverge. Disagreements
among Britain, France, and the United States over NATO policy
toward Bosnia have brought intra-Alliance relations to their
lowest point since France's departure from the integrated
36
military structure (1966) or, perhaps, the Suez Crisis (1956).
Despite cooperation and apparent consensus over meeting Bosnian
Serb threats to the remaining "safe havens," NATO allies have
voiced strong disapproval of congressional efforts to force
President Clinton unilaterally to lift the arms embargo of
37
Bosnia. Ironically, this friction is occurring when concern over
preserving NATO cohesion ostensibly has taken priority over
38
reaching a solution to the Bosnian crisis.
Avoiding the Commitment of U.S. Ground Troops.
Avoiding the employment of ground forces is fraught with
consequences. First, the United States has elevated a means
normally used to assist in achieving a national objective to the
status of a policy goal. In doing so, the United States has stood
the strategy formulation process (i.e., the balancing of
objectives, options, and resources–also known as ends, ways, and
39
means) on its head. In effect, the United States has denied
itself the use of a key element of national power, and
considerably circumscribed its ability to influence resolution of
the conflict through an integrated and complementary application
of national power.
Second, efforts to avoid deploying forces may drive U.S.
short-term decisions that are inimical to long-term U.S.
objectives and interests. For example, the United States has
promised to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should that be
required. That would, however, require the deployment of upwards
of 25,000 U.S. ground troops. To avoid that possibility, the
United States may be forced to take steps to ensure that NATO
allies do not call upon the United States. This might require
increased use of U.S. air power or the employment of additional
U.S. forces in the region (e.g., the French desire to have U.S.
helicopters airlift elements of the Franco-British Rapid Reaction
Force into Gorazde). Either case could be an incremental step
that leads to a deeper U.S. involvement in the crisis that could
eventually lead to the introduction of U.S. ground forces. Thus,



the United States may be caught in the paradoxical "Catch-22"
situation where actions taken to avoid a substantial deployment
40
of ground forces might actually precipitate such an event.
Alternatively, in order to prevent the withdrawal of
UNPROFOR, U.S. policy might be heavily influenced by British or
French pressure. For example, British and French insistence that
the United States not unilaterally lift the arms embargo of
Bosnia undoubtedly contributed to President Clinton's veto of
41
recent congressional legislation. At the very least, the United
States would surrender the initiative to others. At worst, such a
possibility holds the potential to undermine long-term U.S.
leadership or influence in Europe.
CONDITIONS FOR EMPLOYING U.S. MILITARY POWER
Theoretically, once a decision has been made to engage the
United States in a crisis or conflict, and potential options for
employing the elements of national power have been assessed,
policymakers must establish the conditions under which the United
States might employ military force. To guide these deliberations,
A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement notes
that,
The decision on whether and when to use force therefore
is dictated first and foremost by our national
interests. In those specific areas where our vital or
survival interests are at stake, our use of force will
be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. In other
situations posing a less immediate threat, our military
engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas
that most affect our national interests–for instance,
areas where we have a sizable economic stake or
commitment to allies, and areas where there is a
potential to generate substantial refugee flows into
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our nation or our allies.
The National Security Strategy also underscores that such
decisions will be undertaken only after carefully balancing costs
and risks with national interests at stake. Specifically, the
government will consider a number of key issues before committing
military forces:



• Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a
reasonable chance of success?
• Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
• What is the environment of risk we are entering?
• What is needed to achieve our goals?
• What are the potential costs–human and financial–of the
engagement?
• Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the
American people and their elected representatives?
• Do we have time lines that will reveal the extent of
success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit
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strategy?
Not included within the criteria spelled out in the National
Security Strategy are a number of additional questions that merit
reflection. For instance, will the employment of military power
help achieve national objectives? Will allies or partners join,
or at least endorse, the U.S. resort to military force? Will the
application of military force in a specific instance have
ramifications upon broader U.S. interests (e.g., will the
employment of U.S. military power in the Balkans estrange U.S.Russian relations, leading to a "Cold Peace"?)?
Existing guidelines contained in the National Security
Strategy for how military force will be used are equally
explicit. U.S. troops deployed abroad will be assigned clear
missions, and should combat be expected, they will be provided
the means to fight effectively and to achieve their objectives
decisively. To ensure the latter condition, two key questions
must be answered before forces are committed: "What types of
military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use
of military force carefully matched to our political
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objectives?" Moreover, whenever possible, allies and relevant
international organizations will be proportionately incorporated
45
into U.S. plans and activities.
At present, it is not clear that in the case of Bosnia the



United States has sufficiently addressed these important
questions. Certainly, given the previous discussion of the
contradictions inherent in the stated U.S. policy objectives for
resolving the conflict in the Balkans, additional effort should
be devoted to focusing U.S. goals more clearly.
Nor is it entirely clear that these questions have been
thoroughly addressed for ongoing operations or for missions that
the United States has committed itself to perform. For example,
how long will the United States participate in the United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Macedonia? Or, how
long will the United States engage in air operations supporting
Operation DENY FLIGHT, the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over
Bosnia? At present, the duration of these operations appears to
be indeterminable.
Looking to the future, is there a clearly defined,
achievable mission for U.S. participation in implementing a peace
plan? For how long will the United States take part? What is the
"exit strategy" if conflict resumes? And, while assisting the
withdrawal of UNPROFOR, should that become necessary, have the
key questions been answered: What is the mission; for what time
period; has a full risk assessment been accomplished; is there a
reasonable assurance of public support for such an operation?
Answering such difficult questions is not an easy task. But,
where such difficult questions are not asked and forthrightly
answered, policy failure is the likely product. As former
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara indicates in his recent
book, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, the
failure to ask the difficult questions about policy, questions
the answers to which were bound to be unsettling, allowed the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations to make decisions based on
addressing short-term crises. "Over and over again . . . we
failed to address the fundamental issues; our failure to identify
them was not recognized; and deep-seated disagreements among the
president's advisers about how to proceed were neither surfaced
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nor resolved."
Potential Consequences of Minimizing Use
of U.S. Military Power.
To date, the United States has minimized the use of its



military power in the Balkans and neither the administration nor
Congress appears willing to underwrite the employment of ground
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troops beyond existing U.S. commitments. These constraints on
the use of force seem to minimize U.S. risk by maintaining the
status quo, and avoiding a major deployment of ground forces. By
opting not to impose by force the Contact Group's plan, however,
the United States and its allies continue to allow Pale,
Belgrade, Sarajevo, and, lately, Zagreb to shape events, while
concomitantly constraining the U.S. ability to act unilaterally
or as the leader of a coalition. The net result may be a further
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erosion of U.S. credibility.
Failure to confront violence in Bosnia and the Balkans may
have additional and considerable ramifications. Since the Vietnam
War, it has been fashionable among Western intellectuals,
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especially American academics, to ridicule "the Munich analogy."
To be sure, neither Radovan Karadzic nor Slobodan Milosevic is
another Adolf Hitler, and the conditions of 1995 are not
analogous to those that caused World War II. While one can learn
from the study of the past, historical episodes are distinct and
the past does not repeat itself. Be that as it may, Serb
belligerence may encourage other potential aggressors–in Europe,
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and around the world.
Prolonged conflict could also have an adverse effect on
international security institutions. Certainly, the United
Nations would emerge greatly impaired from aggression rewarded in
Bosnia. European security organizations, which help ensure U.S.
interests in that key region of the world, would also suffer a
further erosion of credibility. The OSCE has already suffered
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from its failure to resolve the crisis. NATO's cohesion would
likewise suffer further loss. Moreover, failure in the Balkans
could foment divisions within the EU and its military arm, the
Western European Union (WEU).
Within the United States, domestic support for any future
vigorous foreign policy initiatives could plunge. That might also
lead to reduced support for emerging democracies and purely
humanitarian relief operations. Finally, the combined effect of
an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S. attitude with weakened
support for and credibility of NATO could fragment the Atlantic
Alliance, leading to the renationalization of European security
agendas. None of these outcomes is in U.S. national interests.



Nor is there any guarantee that minimizing the use of force
will continue to contain the conflict within the borders of the
former Yugoslavia, much less within Bosnian territory. As recent
ethnic Serb attacks on the eastern Muslim enclaves and Croatian
seizure of the Krajina region amply demonstrate, a high
likelihood exists that the war can expand quickly. Should
Belgrade choose to come to the aid of ethnic Serbs in Bosnia or
decide to expand the conflict into Slavonia while Croatian forces
are preoccupied in the Krajina, the war could escalate rapidly.
And, as indicated earlier, a rising tide of ethnic Serb refugees
into Kosovo has also exacerbated already high tensions in that
explosive region. Thus, a number of scenarios are possible for
events in the region to spin out of control.
If the United States opts to continue existing policies
eschewing military force, then it will be limited to economic and
diplomatic initiatives. Such efforts have not yet yielded
substantial results at the bargaining table (although the
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cumulative toll is substantial). This leads to two options for
further efforts. On the one hand, U.S. and European negotiators
could continue trying to isolate Bosnian Serbs by inducing
Milosevic's cooperation in more strictly enforcing the existing
embargo in return for temporarily lifting economic sanctions
against Serbia. The Contact Group, however, can agree on neither
the terms for the Serbian side of the deal nor on how long
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sanctions might be lifted. Even if consensus could be achieved
within the Contact Group, there is little historical evidence
that Milosevic will deliver his part of the bargain.
The other option, therefore, is for the United States and
its allies and partners to strengthen the existing embargo of
Serbia and Montenegro, and use economic warfare to force Belgrade
and Pale to change their course. This would require adding to the
commodities prohibited, making the embargo more impermeable, and
subsidizing states (Hungary, Italy, and the Balkan states)
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negatively affected by the increased sanctions. Given the split
within the Contact Group and the unlikelihood of economic
subsidies, this option offers little prospect for success. That
having been said, if the United States and its allies continue to
eschew the application of decisive military power in conjunction
with economic and diplomatic efforts, it may be the only option
available that has any chance for long-term success.



Of course, diplomatic and economic initiatives may not force
the warring parties and their supporters to yield. Indeed, such
efforts may spur them to escalate the conflict within BosniaHercegovina. At that point, the United States and its NATO allies
might be left with lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia as
their only recourse. But, lifting the embargo is likely to draw
swift Bosnian Serb, and perhaps Serbian, response (e.g., renewed
ethnic cleansing, violation of safe havens, and hostage taking).
If the United States and its NATO allies are not prepared to take
steps to forestall such potential Serb actions (such as air
strikes, supplying the Bosnians with equipment, and providing
training), lifting the arms embargo will be little more than, in
the words of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine
55
Albright, "a feel-good option." Ignoring the arms embargo of
Bosnia also could lead to a broader war between Croatia and
Serbia, or to conflict in Kosovo that could draw Albania,
Macedonia, Greece, and their neighbors into a general Balkan war.
Beyond the likely deadly results inside Bosnia, lifting the
arms embargo would have severe repercussions throughout Europe.
Unless the United States is able to build consensus within NATO
for such an option, it has the potential to disrupt U.S.
relations with its key European allies. Moreover, Britain and
France, the nations that bear the largest portion of the UNPROFOR
burden, have threatened to remove their contingents in the event
the United States no longer complies with the arms embargo of
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Bosnia. Undoubtedly, UNPROFOR would collapse, and the United
States would have to make good on its pledge to provide ground
forces to assist in UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Finally, Russia has
threatened to defy the trade sanctions regime against Serbia
should the United States unilaterally overturn the arms embargo
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of Bosnia. Such an outcome would have obvious effects on U.S.Russian, as well as European-Russian relations.
Potential Consequences of an Increased U.S. Military Role.
Writing in the 19th century, Antoine Henri Jomini warned
that, "Wars of opinion . . . originating in religious or
political beliefs, are the most deplorable for they enlist the
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worst passions and become vindictive, cruel, and terrible."
Jomini went on to state that, "No army, however disciplined, can
contend successfully against such resistance unless it be strong



enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its
communications, and at the same time furnish an active force
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sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself."
It is far better, according to Jomini, to let time be "the true
remedy for all bad passions . . . to attempt to restrain such a
mob by force is to attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine
when the powder has already been ignited: it is far better to
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await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater."
Should the United States choose to exert greater levels of
military force in the region, the consequences could be, in our
time, just as significant as they were in Jomini's day. In the
near term, increased involvement will remove the veil of
impartiality in the eyes of the belligerents, for regardless of
how evenhanded the United States and its allies try to be, the
perception will be that they have chosen sides–against the
Bosnian Serbs. The United States also runs the risk of involving
itself in an asymmetric conflict (i.e., the United States
perceives such involvement to be of a limited nature, while the
current belligerents see themselves engaged in a total war of
survival), a circumstance which has caused the United States much
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agony in the past. Moreover, the conflict would divert U.S.
attentions, energies, and resources away from other, equally
pressing issues and initiatives–domestic and external. Finally,
national leaders must reckon with the potential for loss of life
and expenditure of national treasure.
Longer-term consequences are equally daunting. U.S.
policymakers must understand that increased military involvement
in the ongoing conflict indicates, de facto at least, a U.S.
willingness to uphold a Balkan security order. Decisionmakers
must look, therefore, beyond the confines of the existing crisis
in Bosnia-Hercegovina and examine issues in a broader context.
For example, does U.S. intervention to establish the territorial
integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina extend to border guarantees for
Albania or Macedonia, and what would be the repercussions in
Serbia or Greece? What does supporting the self-determination of
Bosnians mean for ethnic Serbs in Bosnia or for ethnic rights in
Kosovo or Vojvodina or for minorities in Macedonia?
Expanded U.S. military involvement in the Balkans may also
risk increasing friction with Russia. Such an outcome could have
consequences not only in the Balkans, but throughout Europe or
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globally. That said, other issues impinging on U.S.-Russian
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relations may also contribute to such an outcome. Hence, the
United States must be aware of potential Russian consequences,
but not necessarily be severely circumscribed by them.
Enlarged U.S. military participation in the conflict also
opens a host of post-conflict questions that require forethought.
Will the United States assist in the apprehension and prosecution
of war criminals? What will be the U.S. role in the repatriation
of peoples and compensation? Will the United States facilitate
the mass exchange of populations and the establishment of
"ethnically pure" states? To what extent will the United States
assist in the development and funding of a comprehensive Balkan
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aid package to assist in post-conflict reconstruction?
Finally, should the United States be unable to sustain an
internal consensus for the prolonged deployment of U.S. forces in
the region, are policymakers prepared for the potential
consequences? Premature removal of U.S. forces from peacekeeping
operations would undermine U.S. credibility throughout the world,
not just in the Balkans or Europe, as the "demonstration effect"
of failure might encourage other states or groups to test U.S.
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resolve. Such an outcome would also have a similar effect on the
credibility of the United Nations and NATO, two institutions that
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loom large in the U.S. global security architecture. Key allies
within NATO might question the level of U.S. commitment to
Europe, with repercussions that extend to U.S. interests
elsewhere in the world (e.g., the Middle East). Finally, a U.S.
withdrawal may add impetus to the rising tide of "neoisolationism" or unilateralism in the United States that will
further undermine U.S. support of international institutions,
which one must emphasize, generally serve U.S. interests.
CONCLUSIONS
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there are no easy
alternatives for U.S. policymakers to pursue in their efforts to
resolve the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia. Each has its
pluses and minuses; each is fraught with risk–including staying
on the present course. But, while the war is complex, confusing,
and appears intractable, the United States should not be deterred
from seeking potential solutions. In fact, the severity of
potential consequences should drive U.S. policymakers to take an



even more proactive role in conflict resolution efforts, for much
more is at stake than simply the fighting in Bosnia.
Should the fighting spill over the borders of the former
Yugoslavia, for example, the stability and security of the entire
Balkan peninsula may be at risk. This disequilibrium could set
back the development of newly emerging market-based democracies
in the region that have struggled successfully, to date, to
change their national and international behavior. An expanded war
also would likely involve Greece and Turkey–two key U.S. and NATO
allies, probably on opposite sides. The ramifications for Balkan
security and NATO would be significant.
Instability in the Balkans naturally influences security
within the remainder of Europe. Most immediately, a massive
exchange of populations could generate a wave of refugees that
destabilizes the region. Of greater importance, perhaps,
prolonged strife in the Balkans could strain relations between
Western Europe and Russia, as well as between the United States
and Russia. This could lead to a nationalization of security
agendas throughout Eastern Europe, which would have cascading
effects for security agendas in Central and Western Europe, as
well.
Continued war in the Balkans also holds significant
potential to increase strains within NATO. As discussed above,
differences with key NATO allies over the course of policy
regarding Bosnia already have placed a heavy strain on relations
within the Alliance. These tensions could be exacerbated by
continued stagnation of the peace process, escalation of the
fighting to include Greece and Turkey, or the withdrawal of
British, French, or other NATO forces from UNPROFOR.
Increased strains within NATO could spur European efforts to
build a Common Security and Foreign Policy based on the European
Union and a European Security and Defense Identity based on the
Western European Union. Either result would reduce the U.S.
ability to influence events in Europe–especially if combined with
a withering of NATO; an outcome certainly not in long-term U.S.
interests.
Continued conflict in the former Yugoslavia is also likely
to diminish support within the United States for substantial U.S.



engagement in international affairs. The apparent ineffectualness
of the United Nations, and the intramural squabbling within NATO
could undermine U.S. public support for both of those key
security organizations; thereby undercutting the larger role
anticipated for these institutions in supporting and promoting
U.S. security interests.
The inability of the United States to shape a resolution of
the war in the former Yugoslavia is likely to have additional
indirect consequences for U.S. global security interests. Should
nations question the depth of U.S. commitment to security and
stability or its willingness to confront aggression, U.S.
influence might be undermined in key areas of the world. At the
same time, potential opponents might perceive that they could
challenge U.S. interests at low levels without fear of penalty.
At the very least, subnational and transnational groups may draw
the lesson that they have a fairly free hand to pursue their
agendas in this new security order. If combined, these phenomena
could have a "snowball" effect that contributes to a downward
spiral of U.S. influence abroad. Eventually, the United States
might find its deterrent capability sufficiently eroded that an
adversary might directly confront major U.S. interests.
Whether a creative and decisive application of U.S. military
power could contribute to a satisfactory conclusion to the war
without causing more harm than good is unknown and probably
unknowable at this juncture. In the wake of its experiences in
Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, the United States
understands that there are limits to what even great powers can
accomplish. Memories of these ordeals, especially when combined
with the frustrations resulting from past efforts to resolve the
apparently intractable Balkan tragedy, temper any inclination to
use military power.
Continued frustration at apparently ineffective economic and
diplomatic initiatives, and a reluctance to use military power to
force a resolution of the crisis might tempt the United States to
withdraw from efforts to end the fighting. But the United States
cannot simply throw up its collective hands and walk away.
Frustrating as the crisis in the Balkans may be, and even if new
efforts fall short, the larger issues involved require continued
U.S. engagement. The consequences for U.S. European and global
security interests are too great.



Moreover, the first major setback of
Serbs has changed conditions sufficiently
flexible and innovative approaches to end
welcome opportunity and the United States
it.

the war for ethnic
to offer an opening for
the fighting. This is a
must make the most of

Because so much is at stake, the United States must use this
opportunity to reassess its policies for ending the war in
Bosnia. This reassessment must take into account not only the
changed conditions on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, but
also larger U.S. European and global security interests. This may
require, for example, that the United States reconsider whether
continued pursuit of the goal of restoring the territorial
integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina serves either its short-term
objective of stopping the fighting or long-term U.S. European and
global security interests. In short, while it may be simplistic
to say it, any decisions concerning further U.S. involvement in
the Bosnian war must be framed in light of the broader
consequences, and not simply to accommodate exigencies of the
day.
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